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Cognition can influence emotion by biasing neural activity in the first cortical region
in which the reward value and subjective pleasantness of stimuli is made explicit in
the representation, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). The same effect occurs in a second
cortical tier for emotion, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Similar effects are found
for selective attention, to for example the pleasantness vs. the intensity of stimuli,
which modulates representations of reward value and affect in the orbitofrontal and
anterior cingulate cortices. The mechanisms for the effects of cognition and attention
on emotion are top-down biased competition and top-down biased activation. Affective
and mood states can in turn influence memory and perception, by backprojected biasing
influences. Emotion-related decision systems operate to choose between gene-specified
rewards such as taste, touch, and beauty. Reasoning processes capable of planning
ahead with multiple steps held in working memory in the explicit system can allow
the gene-specified rewards not to be selected, or to be deferred. The stochastic, noisy,
dynamics of decision-making systems in the brain may influence whether decisions are
made by the selfish-gene-specified reward emotion system, or by the cognitive reasoning
system that explicitly calculates reward values that are in the interests of the individual,
the phenotype.
Keywords: cognition, emotion, orbitofrontal cortex, decision-making, the noisy brain, planning
INTRODUCTION
How do cognition and attention influence brain processing of
emotion-provoking, that is affective, stimuli? What are the neural
mechanisms?
To address this I review some of the experimental evidence
on how cognition and selective attention influence the neural
processing of affective stimuli.
Then I describe a top-down biased activation theory of emo-
tion that provides a mechanism by which cognition and attention
influence emotion and emotion-provoking stimuli.
The emphasis of the paper is on providing a fundamental
framework at the level of brain computation for understand-
ing how cognition and emotion influence each other, and how
decisions are made between an emotional system that has its ori-
gins in gene-specified rewards, and an explicit reasoning system
that allows these rewards to be deferred in favor of long-term
reward value in the interests of the individual (Rolls, 2014). The
approach is based on research by the author and his colleagues,
and complementary research is cited below.
First, I outline an approach (Rolls, 2013b, 2014) to what
emotions are, and what stimuli elicit emotions, to provide a
clear foundation for what processes the cognitive and attentional
inputs must influence.
A DEFINITION OF EMOTIONAL STATES
Emotions can usefully be defined (operationally) as states elicited
by rewards and punishers which have particular functions (Rolls,
1999, 2005, 2013b, 2014). The functions are defined below, and
include working to obtain or avoid the rewards and punishers.
A reward is anything for which an animal (which includes
humans) will work. A punisher is anything that an animal will
escape from or avoid. An example of an emotion might thus
be the happiness produced by being given a particular reward,
such as a pleasant touch, praise, or winning a large sum of
money. Another example of an emotion might be fear produced
by the sound of a rapidly approaching bus, or the sight of an
angry expression on someone’s face. We will work to avoid such
stimuli, which are punishing. Another example would be frustra-
tion, anger, or sadness produced by the omission of an expected
reward, or the termination of a reward such as the death of a loved
one. Another example would be relief, produced by the omission
or termination of a punishing stimulus such as the removal of a
painful stimulus, or sailing out of danger. These examples indi-
cate how emotions can be produced by the delivery, omission, or
termination of rewarding or punishing stimuli, and go some way
to indicate how different emotions could be produced and classi-
fied in terms of the rewards and punishers received, omitted, or
terminated.
I consider elsewhere a slightly more formal definition than
rewards or punishers, in which the concept of reinforcers is intro-
duced, and it is shown that emotions can be usefully seen as
states produced by instrumental reinforcing stimuli (Rolls, 2005,
2014). Instrumental reinforcers are stimuli which, if their occur-
rence, termination, or omission is made contingent upon the
making of a response, alter the probability of the future emis-
sion of that response. Some stimuli are unlearned reinforcers
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(e.g., the taste of food if the animal is hungry, or pain); while
others may become reinforcing by associative learning, because of
their association with such primary reinforcers, thereby becoming
“secondary reinforcers.”
This foundation has been developed (Rolls, 2005) to show how
a very wide range of emotions can be accounted for, as a result of
the operation of a number of factors, including the following:
1. The reinforcement contingency (e.g., whether reward or pun-
ishment is given, or withheld) (see Figure 1).
2. The intensity of the reinforcer (see Figure 1).
3. Any environmental stimulusmight have a number of different
reinforcement associations. (For example, a stimulus might be
associated both with the presentation of a reward and of a
punisher, allowing states such as conflict and guilt to arise).
4. Emotions elicited by stimuli associated with different
primary reinforcers will be different.
5. Emotions elicited by different secondary reinforcing stimuli
will be different from each other (even if the primary rein-
forcer is similar).
6. The emotion elicited can depend on whether an active or
passive behavioral response is possible. (For example, if an
active behavioral response can occur to the omission of a
positive reinforcer, then anger might be produced, but if
only passive behavior is possible, then sadness, depression,
or grief might occur).
By combining these six factors, it is possible to account for a very
wide range of emotions (Rolls, 2005, 2014).
THE FUNCTIONS OF EMOTION
The functions of emotion also provide insight into the nature of
emotion. These functions, described more fully elsewhere (Rolls,
2005), can be summarized as follows:
1. The elicitation of autonomic responses (e.g., a change in heart
rate) and endocrine responses (e.g., the release of adrenaline).
These prepare the body for action.
2. Flexibility of behavioral responses to reinforcing stimuli.
Emotional (and motivational) states allow a simple interface
between sensory inputs and action systems. The essence of
this idea is that goals for behavior are specified by reward
and punishment evaluation. When an environmental stim-
ulus has been decoded as a primary reward or punishment,
or (after previous stimulus-reinforcer association learning) a
secondary rewarding or punishing stimulus, then it becomes
a goal for action. The human can then perform any action
(instrumental action) to obtain the reward, or to avoid the
punisher. Thus there is flexibility of action, and this is in
contrast with stimulus-response, or habit, learning in which
a particular response to a particular stimulus is learned. The
emotional route to action is flexible not only because any
action can be performed to obtain the reward or avoid the
FIGURE 1 | Some of the emotions associated with different
reinforcement contingencies are indicated. Intensity increases away from
the center of the diagram, on a continuous scale. The classification scheme
created by the different reinforcement contingencies consists of (1) the
presentation of a positive reinforcer (S+), (2) the presentation of a negative
reinforcer (S−), (3) the omission of a positive reinforcer (S+) or the
termination of a positive reinforcer (S+ !), and (4) the omission of a negative
reinforcer (S−) or the termination of a negative reinforcer (S− !). It should be
understood that each different reinforcer will produce different emotional
states: this diagram just summarizes the types of emotion that may be
elicited by different contingencies, but the actual emotions will be different
for each reinforcer (see Rolls, 2014).
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punishment, but also because the human can learn in as lit-
tle as one trial that a reward or punishment is associated with
a particular stimulus, in what is termed “stimulus-reinforcer
association learning.”
Selecting between available rewards with their associated costs,
and avoiding punishers with their associated costs, is a process
that can take place both implicitly (unconsciously), and explic-
itly using a language system to enable long-term plans to be
made (Rolls, 2005, 2008b). These many different brain systems,
some involving implicit evaluation of rewards, and others explicit,
verbal, conscious, evaluation of rewards and planned long-term
goals, must all enter into the selector of behavior.
The implication is that operation by animals (including
humans) using reward and punishment systems tuned to dimen-
sions of the environment that increase fitness provides a mode
of operation that can work in organisms that evolve by natural
selection. It is clearly a natural outcome of Darwinian evolution
to operate using reward and punishment systems tuned to fitness-
related dimensions of the environment, if arbitrary responses
are to be made by the animals, rather than just preprogrammed
movements such as tropisms, taxes, and reflexes. This view of
brain design in terms of reward and punishment systems built by
genes that gain their adaptive value by being tuned to a goal for
action offers I believe a deep insight into how natural selection
has shaped many brain systems, and is a fascinating outcome of
Darwinian thought (Rolls, 2005, 2011b, 2014).
The implication in the current context is that we are interested
in processing in brain systems where instrumental rewards and
punishers, and how the processing in these brain systems is mod-
ulated by cognition and by selective attention. A large amount of
evidence shows that reward processing occurs in a tier of struc-
tures involving the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and amygdala (see
Figure 2) (Rolls, 2014). At the preceding stages of processing, the
representations are not of reward value, but instead of what taste
is present and its intensity (the primary taste cortex), what odor is
present (the pyriform cortex), and what visual stimulus is present
(the inferior temporal visual cortex) (see Figure 2) (Rolls, 2014).
EFFECTS OF COGNITION ON EMOTION
To what extent does cognition influence the hedonics of stimuli
that produce emotions, and how far down into the sensory system
does the cognitive influence reach? Examples of the evidence on
this are considered next. Further examples of the effects of cogni-
tion on emotion are described elsewhere (Grabenhorst and Rolls,
2011; Shackman et al., 2011; Lindquist et al., 2012; Ochsner et al.,
2012; Sheppes et al., 2012; Rolls, 2014).
EFFECTS OF COGNITION ON OLFACTORY AND TASTE
REWARD-RELATED PROCESSING
To address this, we performed an fMRI investigation in which the
delivery of a standard test odor (isovaleric acid combined with
cheddar cheese odor, presented orthonasally using an olfactome-
ter) was paired with a descriptor word on a screen, which on
different trials was “cheddar cheese” or “body odor.” Participants
rated the affective value of the test odor as significantly more
pleasant when labeled “cheddar cheese” than when labeled
“body odor,” and these effects reflected activations in the medial
OFC/rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) that had correlations
with the pleasantness ratings (de Araujo et al., 2005). The impli-
cation is that cognitive factors can have profound effects on our
responses to the hedonic properties of affective stimuli, in that
these effects are manifest quite far down into sensory processing,
in that hedonic representations of odors are affected (de Araujo
et al., 2005).
Similar cognitive effects and mechanisms have now been
found for the taste and flavor of food, where the cognitive word
level descriptor was for example “rich delicious flavor” and acti-
vations to flavor were increased in the OFC and regions to which
it projects including the pregenual cingulate cortex and ventral
striatum, but were not influenced in the insular primary taste cor-
tex where activations reflected the intensity (concentration) of the
stimuli (Grabenhorst et al., 2008) (see Figure 3).
EFFECTS OF COGNITION ON TOUCH REWARD-RELATED PROCESSING
The representation of positively affective touch and temperature in
the brain
While there have been many investigations of the neural represen-
tations of pain stimuli (Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2011; Shackman
et al., 2011; Kobayashi, 2012), there have been fewer investigations
of the representation of pleasant touch in the brain.
In one study, the cortical areas that represent affectively
positive and negative aspects of touch were investigated using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) by comparing
activations produced by pleasant touch, painful touch produced
by a stylus, and neutral touch, to the left hand (Rolls et al.,
2003c). It was found that regions of the OFC were activated more
by pleasant touch and by painful stimuli than by neutral touch,
and that different areas of the OFC were activated by the pleas-
ant and painful touches. The OFC activation was related to the
affective aspects of the touch, in that the somatosensory cortex
(S1) was less activated by the pleasant and painful stimuli than
by the neutral stimuli (as shown by a Two-Way analysis of vari-
ance performed on the percentage change of the BOLD signals
under the different stimulation conditions in the different areas).
Further, it was found that a rostral part of the ACC was activated
by the pleasant stimulus and that a more posterior and dorsal part
was activated by the painful stimulus [and this is consistent with
effects in other sensory modalities (Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2011;
Rolls, 2014) (cf. Etkin et al., 2011)]. Regions of the somatosensory
cortex, including S1, and part of S2 in the superior temporal plane
at the mid-insula level, were activated more by the neutral touch
than by the pleasant and painful stimuli. Part of the posterior
insula was activated only in the pain condition, and different parts
of the brainstem, including the central gray, were activated in the
pain, pleasant and neutral touch conditions. The results provide
evidence that different areas of the human OFC are involved in
representing both pleasant touch and pain, and that dissociable
parts of the cingulate cortex are involved in representing pleasant
touch and pain (Rolls et al., 2003c).
Warm and cold stimuli have affective components such as
feeling pleasant or unpleasant, and these components may have
survival value, for approach to warmth and avoidance of coldmay
be reinforcers or goals for action built into us during evolution to
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FIGURE 2 | Organization of cortical processing for computing value (in
Tier 2) and making value-based decisions (in Tier 3) and interfacing to
action systems. The Tier 1 brain regions up to and including the column
headed by the inferior temporal visual cortex compute and represent
neuronally “what” stimulus/object is present, but not its reward or
affective value. Tier 2 represents by its neuronal firing the reward or
affective value, and includes the orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala, and
anterior including pregenual cingulate cortex. Tier 3 is involved in choices
based on reward value (in particular VMPFC area 10), and in different types
of output to behavior. The secondary taste cortex, and the secondary
olfactory cortex, are within the orbitofrontal cortex. V1—primary visual
cortex. V4—visual cortical area V4. PreGen Cing—pregenual cingulate
cortex. “Gate” refers to the finding that inputs such as the taste, smell,
and sight of food in regions where reward value is represented only
produce effects when an appetite for the stimulus (modulated for example
by hunger) is present (Rolls, 2005). Lateral PFC: lateral prefrontal cortex, a
source for top-down attentional and cognitive modulation of affective value
(Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2010). This is a schematic diagram, and is based
on primates including humans, as rodents appear not to have homologs of
some of the areas shown, including the granular prefrontal cortex, which
includes much of the orbitofrontal cortex (Wise, 2008; Passingham and
Wise, 2012); and because rodents have a taste system that is connected
differently, without the obligatory route to the cortex that is shown (Scott
and Small, 2009; Rolls, 2013a, 2014).
direct our behavior to stimuli that are appropriate for survival
(Rolls, 2005). Understanding the brain processing that under-
lies these prototypical reinforcers provides a direct approach to
understanding the brain mechanisms of emotion. In an fMRI
investigation in humans, we showed that the mid-orbitofrontal
and pregenual cingulate cortex and the ventral striatum have acti-
vations that are correlated with the subjective pleasantness ratings
made to warm (41◦C) and cold (12◦C) stimuli, and combinations
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FIGURE 3 | Cognitive modulation of flavor reward processing in the
brain. (A) The medial orbitofrontal cortex was more strongly activated
when a flavor stimulus was labeled “rich and delicious flavor”
(MSGVrich) than when it was labeled “boiled vegetable water”
(MSGVbasic) ([−8 28 −20]). (The flavor stimulus, MSGV, was the taste
0.1M MSG + 0.005M inosine 5′monophosphate combined with a
consonant 0.4% vegetable odor). (B) The timecourse of the BOLD
signals for the two conditions. (C) The peak values of the BOLD
signal (mean across subjects±SEM) were significantly different
(t = 3.06, df = 11, p = 0.01). (D) The BOLD signal in the medial
orbitofrontal cortex was correlated with the subjective pleasantness
ratings of taste and flavor, as shown by the SPM analysis, and as
illustrated (mean across subjects±SEM, r = 0.86, p < 0.001).
[Reproduced with permission from Grabenhorst et al. (2008)].
of warm and cold stimuli, applied to the hand (Rolls et al.,
2008b). Activations in the lateral and some more anterior parts of
the OFC were correlated with the unpleasantness of the stimuli.
In contrast, activations in the somatosensory cortex and ventral
posterior insula were correlated with the intensity but not the
pleasantness of the thermal stimuli (Rolls et al., 2008b).
A principle thus appears to be that processing related to the
affective value and associated subjective emotional experience
of somatosensory and thermal stimuli that are important for
survival is performed in different brain areas to those where acti-
vations are related to sensory properties of the stimuli such as
their intensity. This conclusion appears to be the case for pro-
cessing in a number of sensory modalities, and the finding with
such prototypical stimuli as pleasant and painful touch, andwarm
(pleasant) and cold (unpleasant) thermal stimuli, provides strong
support for this principle (Rolls, 2005; Grabenhorst and Rolls,
2008, 2011; Grabenhorst et al., 2008; Rolls et al., 2008a). An impli-
cation of the principle is that by having a system specialized for
the affective or reward aspects of stimuli it is possible to mod-
ify goal oriented behavior, and to do this independently of being
able to know what the stimulus is (its intensity, physical char-
acteristics etc). Thus even if a stimulus has lost its pleasantness
because of for example a change of core body temperature, it
is still possible to represent the stimulus, recognize it, and learn
about where it is in the environment for future use (Rolls, 2005).
This is a fundamental aspect of brain design (Rolls, 2005, 2008b,
2014).
Cognitive modulation of affective touch processing
There have been many studies of the top-down attentional mod-
ulation (Rolls, 2008b) of touch, with effects typically larger in
secondary somatosensory and association cortical areas (e.g.,
parietal area 7), and smaller in S1 (Johansen-Berg and Lloyd,
2000; Rolls, 2010). However, there has been little investigation
of where high-level cognition influences the representation of
affective touch in the brain.
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To investigate where cognitive influences from the very high
level of language might influence the affective representation of
touch, we performed a fMRI study in which the forearm was
rubbed with a cream, but this could be accompanied by a word
label that indicated that it was a rich moisturizing cream (pleasant
to most people) vs. a basic cream (McCabe et al., 2008).
We found that cognitive modulation by a label at the word
level indicating pleasantness/richness (“rich moisturizing cream”
vs. “basic cream”) influenced the representation of tactile inputs
in the OFC (McCabe et al., 2008). (The cream was identi-
cal in all conditions in the study: it was only the word labels
that were changed. The cream was rubbed onto the ventral
surface of the forearm.) For example, a negative correlation
with the pleasantness ratings of the touch as influenced by the
word labels was found in the lateral OFC, a region shown in
other studies to be activated by less pleasant stimuli including
unpleasant odors, and losing money (O’Doherty et al., 2001;
Rolls et al., 2003b,c). A positive correlation with the pleasant-
ness of touch as influenced by the word labels was found in the
pregenual cingulate cortex (McCabe et al., 2008). Convergent
evidence on the functions of this region is that the pregenual
cingulate region is close to where in different studies another
somatosensory stimulus, oral texture, is represented (de Araujo
and Rolls, 2004), correlations with pleasantness ratings are found
to food and olfactory stimuli (Kringelbach et al., 2003; de
Araujo et al., 2005; Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2011), and pleas-
ant touch produces activation (Rolls et al., 2003c). We also
found that activations to touch in the parietal cortex area 7 were
influenced by the word labels, in that there was more activa-
tion when the rich label than when the thin label was present
(McCabe et al., 2008).
Cognitive modulation of activations to the sight of touch
Cognitive modulation of effects produced by the sight of touch
were investigated by a comparison of the effects of the sight of the
arm being rubbed when accompanied by the label “rich moistur-
izing cream” vs. “basic cream.” Cognitive modulation effects were
found in the pregenual cingulate cortex extending into the OFC,
in regions close to those where activations were correlated with
the pleasantness ratings with the same two stimulus conditions.
The effect of the cognitive label “rich moisturizing cream” was to
make the sight of the touch more pleasant by increasing activa-
tions in these pregenual cingulate and OFC areas (McCabe et al.,
2008).
TOP-DOWN EFFECTS OF SELECTIVE ATTENTION ON
EMOTION
In section “Effects of Cognition on Emotion”, the effects of cog-
nition on emotion were considered, and cognition referred to
for example language-level descriptions of the properties of a
stimulus, such as delicious, or rich and moisturizing. In addi-
tion, paying selective attention to one property of a stimulus,
such as its intensity, vs. another property, such as its pleas-
antness, can be thought of as a top-down attentional effect.
The mechanisms though may be similar, as considered in sec-
tion “A Top-Down Biased Activation Theory of Attentional and
Cognitive Modulation.”
TASTE, OLFACTION, AND FLAVOR
We have found that with taste and flavor (Grabenhorst and Rolls,
2008) stimuli, and olfactory (Rolls et al., 2008a) stimuli, selec-
tive attention to pleasantness modulates representations in the
OFC (see Figure 4), whereas selective attention to intensity mod-
ulates activations in areas such as the primary taste cortex. Thus,
depending on the context in which tastes and odors are presented
and whether affect is relevant, the brain responds to taste, flavor,
and odor, differently.
These findings show that when attention is paid to affective
value, the brain systems engaged to represent the stimulus are
different from those engaged when attention is directed to the
physical properties of a stimulus such as its intensity.
This differential biasing by prefrontal cortex attentional mech-
anisms (Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2010; Ge et al., 2012) of brain
regions engaged in processing a sensory stimulus depending
on whether the cognitive demand is for affect-related vs. more
sensory-related processing may be an important aspect of cogni-
tion and attention which have implications for how strongly the
reward system is driven by stimuli including food, and thus for
eating and the control of appetite (Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2008,
2011; Rolls et al., 2008a; Rolls, 2012). This important concept is
addressed further below.
POSSIBLE SOURCES OF THE TOP-DOWN MODULATION OF EMOTIONAL
PROCESSING
There is relatively little prior evidence on the top-down source
of the bias when attention is to affective (emotional) vs. sensory
aspects (e.g., the intensity) of the same stimulus (Pessoa, 2009).
In a study using psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis,
we found that two sites where selective attention to pleasantness
increased the activation to taste, the OFC and a region to which
it is connected, the pregenual cingulate cortex, both had func-
tional connectivity with a quite anterior (mean y ≈ 50) part of
the lateral prefrontal cortex, illustrated in Grabenhorst and Rolls
(2010). These parts of the OFC and pregenual cingulate cortex are
a functionally appropriate target site for a top-down attentional
modulation, in that their activations are correlated with the sub-
jectively rated pleasantness of the taste (Grabenhorst and Rolls,
2008). Moreover, the lateral prefrontal cortex has been shown to
represent current task sets and attentional demands for different
types of tasks (Sakai and Passingham, 2003, 2006).
The statistics used in the calculation of PPI effects (Friston
et al., 1997) do not reveal the directionality of the connectivity,
for they are based on correlations. However, the directional-
ity in this case is likely to be from the prefrontal cortex to the
orbitofrontal and pregenual cingulate cortices, for the following
reasons. First, the prefrontal cortex has a powerfully developed
recurrent collateral system which provides the basis for the short-
term memory (Rolls and Deco, 2002; Deco and Rolls, 2005a;
Rolls, 2008b) that is needed to hold the subject of attention
active, providing the source of the bias for top-down biased com-
petition (Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Rolls and Deco, 2002;
Deco and Rolls, 2005a; Rolls, 2008b). Second, prefrontal cortex
lesions impair attention (Beck and Kastner, 2009; Rossi et al.,
2009). Third, activations in areas of the lateral prefrontal cortex
are related to task set, attentional instructions, and remembering
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FIGURE 4 | Effect of paying attention to the pleasantness vs. the
intensity of a taste stimulus. (A) Top: A significant difference related to the
taste period was found in the taste insula at [42 18 −14], z = 2.42, p < 0.05
(indicated by the cursor) and in the mid insula at [40 −2 4], z = 3.03,
p < 0.025. Middle: Taste insula. Right: The parameter estimates
(mean±SEM across subjects) for the activation at the specified coordinate
for the conditions of paying attention to pleasantness or to intensity. The
parameter estimates were significantly different for the taste insula t = 4.5,
df = 10, p = 0.001. Left: The correlation between the intensity ratings and
the activation (% BOLD change) at the specified coordinate (r = 0.91,
df = 14, p << 0.001). Bottom: Mid insula. Right: The parameter estimates
(mean±SEM across subjects) for the activation at the specified coordinate
for the conditions of paying attention to pleasantness or to intensity. The
parameter estimates were significantly different for the mid insula t = 5.02,
df = 10, p = 0.001. Left: The correlation between the intensity ratings and
the activation (% BOLD change) at the specified coordinate (r = 0.89,
df = 15, p << 0.001). The taste stimulus, monosodium glutamate, was
identical on all trials. (B) Top: A significant difference related to the taste
period was found in the medial orbitofrontal cortex at [−6 14 −20], z = 3.81,
p < 0.003 (toward the back of the area of activation shown) and in the
pregenual cingulate cortex at [−4 46 −8], z = 2.90, p < 0.04 (at the cursor).
Middle: Medial orbitofrontal cortex. Right: The parameter estimates
(mean±SEM across subjects) for the activation at the specified coordinate
for the conditions of paying attention to pleasantness or to intensity. The
parameter estimates were significantly different for the orbitofrontal cortex
t = 7.27, df = 11, p < 10−4. Left: The correlation between the pleasantness
ratings and the activation (% BOLD change) at the specified coordinate
(r = 0.94, df = 8, p << 0.001). Bottom: Pregenual cingulate cortex.
Conventions as above. Right: The parameter estimates were significantly
different for the pregenual cingulate cortex t = 8.70, df = 11, p < 10−5. Left:
The correlation between the pleasantness ratings and the activation (%
BOLD change) at the specified coordinate (r = 0.89, df = 8, p = 0.001). The
taste stimulus, 0.1M monosodium glutamate, was identical on all trials.
[Reproduced with permission from Grabenhorst and Rolls (2008)].
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rules that guide task performance (Sakai and Passingham, 2003;
Deco and Rolls, 2005a; Sakai and Passingham, 2006; Veldhuizen
et al., 2007; Beck and Kastner, 2009; Bengtsson et al., 2009;
Kouneiher et al., 2009; Rossi et al., 2009). Fourth, direct anatomi-
cal connections exist between the lateral prefrontal cortex and the
orbitofrontal and pregenual cingulate cortices (Price, 2006).
The conclusion that these findings suggest is therefore that a
part of the lateral prefrontal cortex, not a site normally impli-
cated in affective value and emotion, may be able to modulate
emotion-/affect-related processing in the brain by a top-down
attentional influence. This may be one way in which higher cog-
nitive functions, such as a reasoning-based strategy and route to
action, or verbal instruction to direct processing toward or away
from emotion-related brain processing, or conscious volition, can
influence the degree to which the affect-related parts of the brain
process incoming (or potentially remembered) stimuli that can
produce emotional responses. This is thus a part of the way in
which cognition can influence, and control, emotion (Rolls, 2005,
2011a, 2014; Pessoa, 2009).
We also found that two sites where selective attention to inten-
sity increased the activation to the taste delivery into the mouth,
the anterior and mid insula, both had functional connectivity
with a less anterior (mean y ≈ 37) part of the lateral prefrontal
cortex (Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2010). These parts of the insula
are a functionally appropriate site for a top-down attentional
modulation, in that their activations are correlated with the sub-
jectively rated intensity of the taste (Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2008;
Grabenhorst et al., 2008). The anterior insular site may be the
primary taste cortex (Pritchard et al., 1986; Yaxley et al., 1990;
de Araujo et al., 2003a; de Araujo and Rolls, 2004; Rolls, 2008a),
and the mid-insular site a region activated by other oral includ-
ing somatosensory and fat texture inputs from the oral cavity
(de Araujo et al., 2003b; de Araujo and Rolls, 2004) and per-
haps by taste per se (Small et al., 2003) in that the activations
there were correlated with the trial-by-trial subjective ratings of
the taste intensity made during the scanning (Grabenhorst and
Rolls, 2008). In the analyses described here, such somatosensory
inputs could contribute to the attention-dependent correlations
found between the mid insula and other areas.
The interpretation of this functional connectivity revealed
with PPI (Friston et al., 1997) is that the prefrontal cortex and
orbitofrontal/pregenual cingulate areas covary in their activations
more strongly when attention is directed to pleasantness than to
intensity. In this study, the implication is that when the activity in
the orbitofrontal and pregenual cingulate areas is high, as it is on
trials when attention is paid to pleasantness relative to trials when
attention is paid to intensity, then activations in this prefrontal
cortex region are also high. A large source of this variation which
gives rise to the PPI effect is thus the difference in the activations
on different trial types which can be captured by the correlation
arising from the difference in the mean activations of both sites
(orbitofrontal/pregenual cingulate cortices and prefrontal cortex)
on each of the two trial types (see further O’Reilly et al., 2012).
However, in addition to this source of variation, it could be that
when two areas are functionally interacting strongly, there may
be an additional contribution to the connectivity term produced
by the trial-by-trial variation within a type of trial. For example,
on trials on which pleasantness is the subject of attention, then
any small variation on a particular trial in the prefrontal cor-
tex would be expected to be reflected in the activations in the
orbitofrontal/pregenual cingulate cortex. This effect would arise
because when both areas are active, the neurons in each area may
be operating on a relatively linear part of their activation func-
tion, producing strong coupling, whereas when one or both areas
are relatively inactive, with only spontaneous firing, then the neu-
rons may be subject to some effects produced by being close to
the firing threshold, such that small changes in input may pro-
duce a smaller than linear effect on the output. This trial-by-trial
variation corresponds in information theoretic analysis of neu-
ronal covariation to a “noise” effect as compared to a “signal”
effect (Oram et al., 1998; Rolls et al., 2003a; Rolls, 2008b; Rolls
and Treves, 2011).
GRANGER CAUSALITY USED TO INVESTIGATE THE SOURCE OF THE
TOP-DOWN BIASING OF AFFECTIVE PROCESSING
Correlations between signals, including signals at the neuronal
or at the functional neuroimaging level, do not reveal the direc-
tion of the possible influence of one signal on the other. PPI
analysis is based on correlations. Understanding how one brain
area may influence another, for example by providing it with
inputs, or by top-down modulation, is fundamental to under-
standing how the brain functions (Mechelli et al., 2004; Bar,
2007; Bressler and Menon, 2010). Hence, inferring causal influ-
ences from time series data has been attracting intensive interest.
Recently, Granger causality has become increasingly popular due
to its easy implementation and many successful applications to
econometrics, neuroscience, etc., and in particular, the study of
brain function (Ding et al., 2006; Bressler et al., 2008; Deshpande
et al., 2010; Hwang et al., 2010; Schippers et al., 2010; Bressler
and Seth, 2011; Jiao et al., 2011; Luo et al., 2011). The applica-
tion of Granger causality analysis to BOLD fMRI signals which are
inherently slow has been discussed elsewhere (David et al., 2008;
Deshpande et al., 2010; Schippers and Keysers, 2011; Valdes-
Sosa et al., 2011; Stephan and Roebroeck, 2012; Luo et al.,
in revision).
Granger causality is based on precedence and predictability.
Originally proposed by Wiener (1956) and further formalized by
Granger (1969), it states that given two times series x and y, if
the inclusion of the past history of y helps to predict the future
states of x in some plausible statistical sense, then y is a cause of x
in the Granger sense. In spite of the wide acceptance of this def-
inition, classical Granger causality is not tailored to measure the
effects of interactions between time series x and y on the causal
influences, and cannot measure systematically the effects of the
past history of x on x (Ge et al., 2012). A componential form
of Granger causality analysis has recently been introduced which
has advantages over classical Granger analysis (Ge et al., 2012).
Componential Granger causality measures the effect of y on x,
but allows interaction effects between y and x to be measured
(Ge et al., 2012). In addition, the terms in componential Granger
causality sum to 1, allowing causal effects to be directly compared
between systems.
We showed using componential Granger causality analy-
sis applied to an fMRI investigation that there is a top-down
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attentional effect from the anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
to the OFC when attention is paid to the pleasantness of a taste,
and that this effect depends on the activity in the OFC as shown
by the interaction term (Ge et al., 2012). Correspondingly there is
a top-down attentional effect from the posterior dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex to the insular primary taste cortex when attention is
paid to the intensity of a taste, and this effect depends on the activ-
ity of the insular primary taste cortex as shown by the interaction
term. The prefrontal cortex sites are those identified by the PPI
analysis (Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2010) and the effects are shown
schematically in Figure 5. Componential Granger causality thus
not only can reveal the directionality of effects between areas (and
these can be bidirectional), but also allows the mechanisms to be
understood in terms of whether the causal influence of one system
on another depends on the state of the system being causally influ-
enced. Componential Granger causality measures the full effects
of second order statistics by including variance and covariance
effects between each time series, thus allowing interaction effects
to be measured, and also provides a systematic framework within
which to measure the effects of cross, self, and noise contribu-
tions to causality (Ge et al., 2012). The findings reveal some of
the mechanisms involved in a biased activation theory of selective
attention.
A TOP-DOWN BIASED ACTIVATION THEORY OF
ATTENTIONAL AND COGNITIVE MODULATION
The way that we think of top-down biased competition as operat-
ing normally in for example visual selective attention (Desimone
and Duncan, 1995) is that within an area, e.g., a cortical region,
some neurons receive a weak top-down input that increases
their response to the bottom-up stimuli (Desimone and Duncan,
1995), potentially supralinearly if the bottom-up stimuli are
weak (Rolls and Deco, 2002; Deco and Rolls, 2005a; Rolls,
2008b). The enhanced firing of the biased neurons then, via the
local inhibitory neurons, inhibits the other neurons in the local
area from responding to the bottom-up stimuli. This is a local
mechanism, in that the inhibition in the neocortex is primarily
local, being implemented by cortical inhibitory neurons that typ-
ically have inputs and outputs over no more than a fewmm (Rolls
and Deco, 2002; Douglas et al., 2004; Rolls, 2008b). This model of
biased competition is illustrated in Figure 6B.
This locally implemented biased competition situation may
not apply in the present case, where we have facilitation of
processing in a whole cortical area (e.g., OFC, or pregenual cin-
gulate cortex) or even cortical processing stream (e.g., the linked
orbitofrontal and pregenual cingulate cortex) in which any taste
neurons may reflect pleasantness and not intensity. So the atten-
tional effect might more accurately be described in this case
as biased activation, without local competition being part of
the effect. This biased activation theory and model of attention,
illustrated in Figure 6A, is a rather different way to implement
attention in the brain than biased competition, and each mecha-
nism may apply in different cases, or both mechanisms in some
cases.
The biased activation theory of top-down attentional and cog-
nitive control is as follows, and is illustrated in Figure 6A. There
are short-term memory systems implemented as cortical attrac-
tor networks with recurrent collateral connections to maintain
neuronal activity (Rolls, 2008b) that provide the source of the
top-down activation. The short-term memory systems may be
separate (as shown in Figure 6A), or could be a single network
with different attractor states for the different selective attention
conditions. The top-down short-termmemory systems hold what
is being paid attention to active by continuing firing in an attrac-
tor state, and bias separately either cortical processing system 1, or
cortical processing system 2. This weak top-down bias interacts
FIGURE 5 | Componential Granger causality analysis of top-down effects
on taste processing from different lateral prefrontal cortex areas during
attention to either the pleasantness (A) or to the intensity (B) of a taste.
Significant causal influences from t-tests with a Bonferroni correction are
marked by blue arrows (i.e., cross-componential Granger causality is greater
than 0). Red arrows indicate where significant top-down effects exist in
addition to significant causal influences (i.e., a significant cross-componential
Granger causality that is different in the two directions). The areas are
anterior (mean y ≈ 50) and posterior (mean y ≈ 37) lateral prefrontal cortex
(antLPFC, postLPFC); orbitofrontal cortex secondary cortical taste area (OFC);
and anterior insular cortex primary cortical taste area (antINS). [Reproduced
with permission from Ge et al. (2012)].
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FIGURE 6 | (A) Biased activation. The short-term memory systems that
provide the source of the top-down activations may be separate (as shown),
or could be a single network with different attractor states for the different
selective attention conditions. The top-down short-term memory systems
hold what is being paid attention to active by continuing firing in an attractor
state, and bias separately either cortical processing system 1, or cortical
processing system 2. This weak top-down bias interacts with the bottom up
input to the cortical stream and produces an increase of activity that can be
supralinear (Deco and Rolls, 2005b). Thus the selective activation of separate
cortical processing streams can occur. In the example, stream 1 might
process the affective value of a stimulus, and stream 2 might process the
intensity and physical properties of the stimulus. The outputs of these
separate processing streams then must enter a competition system, which
could be for example a cortical attractor decision-making network that makes
choices between the two streams, with the choice biased by the activations
in the separate streams (see text). (B) Biased competition. There is usually a
single attractor network that can enter different attractor states to provide the
source of the top-down bias (as shown). If it is a single network, there can be
competition within the short-term memory attractor states, implemented
through the local GABA inhibitory neurons. The top-down continuing firing of
one of the attractor states then biases in a top-down process some of the
neurons in a cortical area to respond more to one than the other of the
bottom-up inputs, with competition implemented through the GABA
inhibitory neurons (symbolized by a filled circle) which make feedback
inhibitory connections onto the pyramidal cells (symbolized by a triangle) in
the cortical area. The thick vertical lines above the pyramidal cells are the
dendrites. The axons are shown with thin lines and the excitatory
connections by arrow heads.
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with the bottom-up input to the cortical stream and produces
an increase of activity that can be supralinear (Deco and Rolls,
2005b; Rolls, 2008b). Thus the selective activation of separate cor-
tical processing streams can occur. In the example, stream 1might
process the affective value of a stimulus, and stream 2 might
process the intensity and physical properties of the stimulus.
The top-down bias needs to be weak relative to the bottom-up
input, for the top-down bias must not dominate the system, oth-
erwise bottom-up inputs, essential for perception and survival,
would be over-ridden. Under such conditions, top-down atten-
tional and cognitive effects will be largest when the bottom-up
inputs are not too strong or are ambiguous, and that has been
shown to be the case in realistic simulations with integrate-and-
fire neurons (Deco and Rolls, 2005b; Rolls, 2008b). The weakness
of the top-down biasing input is included as a part of brain
design, for the top-down inputs are effectively backprojections
from higher cortical areas, and these end on the apical den-
drites of cortical pyramidal cells, and so have weaker effects than
the bottom up inputs, which make connections lower down the
dendrite toward the cell body (Rolls, 2008b) (see Figures 6, 7).
I suggest here that the correct connections could be set up in
such a system by the following associative (Hebbian) synaptic
learning process. The top-down backprojection synapses would
increase in strength when there is activity in a population of
short-term memory neurons that by their firing hold attention
in one direction (e.g., the short-term memory system for corti-
cal stream 1 shown in Figure 6A), and simultaneously there is
activity in the neurons that receive the top-down inputs (e.g., in
cortical stream 1 shown in Figure 6A).
The outputs of the separate processing streams showing biased
activation (Figure 6A) may need to be compared later to lead
to a single behavior. One way in which this comparison could
take place is by both outputs entering a single network cortical
attractor model of decision-making, in which positive feedback
implemented by the excitatory recurrent collateral connections
leads through non-linear dynamics to a single winner, which is
ensured by competition between the different possible attractor
states produced through inhibitory neurons (Wang, 2002, 2008;
FIGURE 7 | Pyramidal cells in, for example, layers 2 and 3 of the
temporal lobe association cortex receive forward inputs from
preceding cortical stages of processing, and also backprojections from
the amygdala. It is suggested that the backprojections from the amygdala
make modifiable synapses on the apical dendrites of cortical pyramidal cells
during learning when amygdala neurons are active in relation to a mood
state; and that the backprojections from the amygdala via these modified
synapses allow mood state to influence later cognitive processing, for
example by facilitating some perceptual representations.
Deco and Rolls, 2006; Rolls and Deco, 2010; Deco et al., 2012).
A second way in which the competition could be implemented
is by that usually conceptualized as important in biased compe-
tition (Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Rolls and Deco, 2002; Deco
and Rolls, 2005a,b), in which a feedforward competitive network
using inhibition through local inhibitory neurons provides a way
for a weak top-down signal to bias the output especially if the
bottom-up inputs are weak (Rolls and Deco, 2002; Deco and
Rolls, 2005b; Rolls, 2008b), and this implementation is what is
shown at the bottom of Figure 6B. A third way in which the
biased activation reflected in the output of the streams shown in
Figure 6A could be taken into account is by a mechanism such as
that in the basal ganglia, where in the striatum the different excita-
tory inputs activate GABA (gamma-amino-butyric acid) neurons,
which then directly inhibit each other to make the selection (Rolls,
2005, 2008b).
The difference between biased competition and biased acti-
vation may be especially important in the context of functional
neuroimaging, for biased activation, in which processing in whole
cortical areas is facilitated by selective attention, can be revealed
by functional neuroimaging, which operates at relatively low
spatial resolution, in the order of mm. In contrast, biased compe-
tition may selectively facilitate some pyramidal neurons within a
local cortical area which then through the local GABA inhibitory
neurons compete with the other pyramidal neurons in the area
receiving bottom-up input. In this situation, in which some but
not other neurons within a cortical area are showing enhanced fir-
ing, functional neuroimagingmay not be able to show which local
population of pyramidal cells is winning the competition due to
the top-down bias. The evidence presented by Grabenhorst and
Rolls (2010) is that not only the processing streams, but also even
the short-term memory systems in the prefrontal cortex that pro-
vide the top-down source of the biased activation, are physically
separate, as illustrated in Figure 5A.
A possibility arising from this model is that some competition
may occur somewhere in the attentional system before the output
stage, and one possible area is within the prefrontal cortex, where
it is a possibility that the attractors that implement the short-term
memory for attention to pleasantness (at Y≈ 50) may inhibit the
attractors that implement the short-term memory for attention
to intensity (at Y≈ 37), which could occur if there is some phys-
ical overlap between their zones of activation, even if the peaks
are well separated. Some evidence for this possibility was found
(Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2010), in that the correlation between the
% BOLD activations in these two prefrontal cortex regions was
r = −0.72 (p = 0.0034) on the pleasantness trials; and r = −0.8
(p < 0.001) on the intensity trials. In a biased competition model
(Figure 6B) we would normally think of the short-term memory
attractors that provide the source of the bias as being within the
same single attractor network, so that there would be competi-
tion between the two attractor states through the local inhibitory
interneurons. In the biased activation model (Figure 6A), it is an
open issue about whether the attractors that provide the source of
the top-downbias are in the same single network, or are physically
separate making interactions between the attractor states difficult
through the short-range cortical inhibitory neurons. The find-
ings just described indicate that in the case of top-down control
of affective vs. intensity processing of taste stimuli, although the
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two attractors are somewhat apart in the prefrontal cortex, there
is some functional inhibitory interaction between them.
The principle of biased activation providing a mechanism for
selective attention probably extends beyond processing in the
affective vs. sensory coding cortical streams. It may provide the
mechanism also for effects in for example the dorsal vs. the ven-
tral visual system, in which attention to the motion of a moving
object may enhance processing in the dorsal stream, and atten-
tion to the identity of the moving object may enhance processing
in the ventral visual stream (Brown, 2009). Similar biased activa-
tion may contribute to the different localization in the prefrontal
cortex of systems involved in “what” vs. “where” working mem-
ory (Deco et al., 2004; Rottschy et al., 2012). Biased activation as
a mechanism for top-down selective attention may be widespread
in the brain, and may be engaged when there is segregated pro-
cessing of different attributes of stimuli (Grabenhorst and Rolls,
2010).
A NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL MECHANISM FOR TOP-DOWN
ATTENTION
We have developed an integrate-and-fire neuronal model of how
top-down attentional effects operate at the neuronal level (Deco
and Rolls, 2005b). The model has neurons with the membrane
potential driven by the dynamically modeled synaptic currents
(Brunel and Wang, 2001; Rolls, 2008b; Rolls and Deco, 2010),
and allows biophysical properties of the ion channels affected by
synapses, and of the membrane dynamics, to be incorporated,
and shows how the non-linear interactions between bottom-up
effects (produced for example by altering stimulus contrast) and
top-down attentional effects can account for neurophysiologi-
cal results in areas MT and V4 l (Deco and Rolls, 2005b). The
model and simulations show that attention has its major mod-
ulatory effect at intermediate levels of bottom-up input, and that
the effect of attention disappears at high levels of contrast of the
competing stimulus.
The model assumes no kind of multiplicative attentional
effects on the gain of neuronal responses. Instead, in the model,
both top-down attention and bottom-up input information (con-
trast) are implemented in the same way, via additive synaptic
effects in the postsynaptic neurons. There is of course a non-
linearity in the effective activation function of the integrate-
and-fire neurons, and this is what we identify as the source of
the apparently multiplicative (Martinez-Trujillo and Treue, 2002)
effects of top-down attentional biases on bottom-up inputs. The
relevant part of the effective activation function of the neurons
(the relation between the firing and the injected excitatory cur-
rents) is the threshold non-linearity, and the first steeply rising
part of the activation function, where just above threshold the
firing increases markedly with small increases in synaptic inputs
(Brunel and Wang, 2001). Attention was therefore interpreted as
a phenomenon that results from purely additive synaptic effects,
non-linear effects in the neurons, and cooperation-competition
dynamics in the network, which together yield a variety of modu-
latory effects, including effects that appear (Martinez-Trujillo and
Treue, 2002) to be multiplicative. In addition, we were able to
show that the non-linearity of the NMDA receptors may facilitate
non-linear attentional effects, but is not necessary for them. This
was shown by disabling the voltage-dependent non-linearity of
the NMDA receptors in the simulations (Deco and Rolls, 2005b).
EFFECTS OF EMOTION ON COGNITIVE PROCESSING
Emotional states can influence memory (McIntyre et al., 2012)
and perception (Pessoa, 2010). A brain system where effects of
emotional state and mood on storage and recall could be instan-
tiated is in the backprojection system from structures important
in emotion such as the amygdala and OFC to parts of the
cerebral cortex important in the representation of objects, such
as the inferior temporal visual cortex, and more generally, to
parts of the cerebral cortex involved in storing memories. It is
suggested (Rolls, 1989, 2008b; Treves and Rolls, 1994) that co-
activity between forward inputs and backprojecting inputs to
strongly activated cortical pyramidal cells would lead to both
sets of synapses being modified (see Figure 7). This could result
in facilitation or recall of cortical representations (for example
of particular faces) that had become associated with emotional
states, represented by activity in the amygdala).
A theory of how the effects of mood on memory and per-
ception could be implemented in the brain has been developed
(Rolls, 1989, 1999, 2005) and tested (Rolls and Stringer, 2001).
The architecture, shown in Figure 8, uses the massive backpro-
jections from parts of the brain where mood is represented,
such as the OFC and amygdala, to the cortical areas such as the
inferior temporal visual cortex and hippocampus-related areas
(labeled IT in Figure 8) that project into these mood-representing
areas (Amaral et al., 1992). The model uses an attractor net-
work (see Rolls, 2008b Appendix 2) in the mood module (labeled
amygdala in Figure 8), which helps the mood to be an endur-
ing state, and also an attractor in the inferior temporal visual
cortex (IT) (or any other cortical area that receives backpro-
jections from the amygdala or OFC). The system is treated as
a system of coupled attractors (Rolls, 2008b), but with an odd
twist: many different perceptual states are associated with any
FIGURE 8 | Architecture used to investigate how mood can affect
perception and memory. The IT module represents brain areas such as
the inferior temporal cortex involved in perception and hippocampus-related
cortical areas that have forward connections to regions such as the
amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex involved in mood and emotion (after Rolls
and Stringer, 2001).
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one mood state. Overall, there is a large number of percep-
tual/memory states, and only a few mood states, so that there is
a many-to-one relation between perceptual/memory states and
the associated mood states. The network displays the properties
that one would expect [provided that the coupling parameters g
for the synaptic strengths between the attractors are weak (Rolls,
2008b)]. These include the ability of a perceptual input to trig-
ger a mood state in the “amygdala” module if there is not an
existing mood, but greater difficulty to induce a new mood if
there is already a strong mood attractor present; and the ability
of the mood to affect via the backprojections which memories or
perceptual states are triggered (Rolls and Stringer, 2001).
Another interesting finding was that the forward connections
to the mood module from the memory module must be relatively
strong, if new inputs to the memory module are to alter the fir-
ing in the mood module by overcoming an existing mood state
being kept active by the recurrent collateral connections (Rolls
and Stringer, 2001). These results are consistent with the general
effects needed for forward and backward projections in the brain,
namely that forward projections must be relatively strong in order
to produce new firing in a module when a new (forward) input
is received, and backward projections must be relatively weak,
if they are to mildly implement “top-down” constraints without
dominating the activity of earlier modules (Renart et al., 1999a,b,
2001; Rolls, 2008b). Consistent with this, forward projections ter-
minate on cortical neurons closer to the cell body (where they
can have a stronger influence) than backprojections (which typ-
ically terminate on the distal extremities of the apical dendrite
of cortical neurons, in layer 1, the top layer of the cortex (Rolls,
2008b).
An interesting property that was revealed by the model is
that because of the many-to-few mapping of perceptual to mood
states, an effect of a mood was that it tended to make all the per-
ceptual or memory states associated with a particular mood more
similar then they would otherwise have been (Rolls and Stringer,
2001). The implication is that the coupling parameter g for the
backprojections must be quite weak, as otherwise interference
increases in the perceptual/memory module.
In summary, emotional states may affect whether or how
strongly memories are stored using the basal forebrain mem-
ory strobe (Rolls, 2005); be stored as part of many memories in
for example the hippocampus (Rolls, 2005); and may influence
both the recall of such memories, and the operation of cogni-
tive processing, using backprojections in the way described in
the preceding paragraphs. In turn, cognitive inputs can influence
affective states, as described earlier in this paper.
CONCLUSIONS
We have thus seen that cognition can influence emotion by bias-
ing neural activity in the first cortical region in which the reward
value and subjective pleasantness of stimuli is made explicit in
the representation, the OFC. The same effect occurs in a second
cortical tier for emotion, the ACC. Similar effects are found for
selective attention, to for example the pleasantness vs. the inten-
sity of stimuli, which modulates representations of reward value
and affect in the orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate cortices. The
mechanisms for the effects of cognition and attention on emotion
are top-down biased competition and top-down biased activa-
tion. Affective andmood states can in turn influence memory and
perception, by backprojected biasing influences.
Emotion-related decision systems operate to choose between
gene-specified rewards such as taste, touch, and beauty. Reasoning
processes capable of planning ahead with multiple steps held
in working memory in the explicit system can allow the gene-
specified rewards not to be selected, or to be deferred (Rolls,
2014). The decisions between the selfish-gene-specified rewards,
and the explicitly, cognitively, calculated rewards that are in the
interests of the individual, the phenotype, may be influenced by
the stochastic, noisy, dynamics of decision-making systems in the
brain (Rolls and Deco, 2010; Rolls, 2013c).
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